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However, the attack on reductionism comes from two quarters. One indeed
is the misty idealism of the dualist position, which P & D refer to uneasily in
their conclusion. The second does not retreat from materialism but
transcends it; this is the method ignored by most western philosophy of mind
over the past century: that of dialectical materialism. I do not argue that dia-
lectics "solves" the mind/brain problem, or that its growth and development
has been without tremendous difficulties, both conceptual and political, in
the last fifty years, but I do claim that it provides a method for the develop-
ment of a solution (see Lewontin and Levins 1976, for a clear statement of
what the dialectical method in biology involves). For dialectical materialism
the statement of identity offered by reductionism remains. Mind is brain, but
at a different level of analysis and of discourse.
To see how this slogan cashes in, in practice, consider the relationship
between the firing of particular hypothalamic cells and the experience of
anger. For the reductionist the firing of these cells causes the sensation
called anger (in fact, it looks from their conclusion as if P & D's dualism can
be interpreted in this way too). For the dualist of the Penfield/Eccles ilk, the
mind, wishing to produce the manifestation of anger, causes the
hypothalamic cells to fire, and the body responds according to automatic
blind-pilot landing mechanisms.
For the dialectical materialist (at least my sort of dialectical materialism)
the firing of the hypothalamic cells is anger; that is, "anger" and the "firing of
particular hypothalamic cells" are statements that describe the same
phenomenon at different hierarchical levels of discourse. A description of the
phenomenon is possible in either mind language or brain language. Each
language system is valid and can be complete at its own level (the "cause"
of the anger may be a perceived insult to the individual's experience; the
"cause" of the hypothalamic cells' firing is the antecedent firing of certain
other cells, inputs from the sensory systems, etc.). Mistakes emerge and
confusions arise when one tries to locate causes at one level in terms of con-
sequences at another level. The task of neurobiology becomes the identifica-
tion of the translation rules that map mind events onto brain events,
psychology onto physiology-the discovery at each level of the necessary,
sufficient, and exclusive correlates of events at the other. Such a task needs
a cool conceptual head and a rigorous approach to experimentation in which
theory and practice in the neurosciences become united.
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Are the properties of cells relevant for understanding consciousness? A
materialist can respond to the Puccetti & Dykes argument in two ways. A de-
fensive approach is to counter their position on their own terrain, by showing
that the cellular anatomy of the brain is not incompatible with a materialist
approach. Arguments such as I, III, and V seem to me valid ones of this type.
Yet it seems unlikely that a strong positive materialist argument on why con-
sciousness should exist will be developed with this sort of approach.
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However the argument by analogy from computer systems [VI] makes it
clear that paradoxes, including that claimed by P & D, can arise because the
problem is being tackled at an inappropriate conceptual level. It is likely,
though, that the hardware/software analogy over emphasizes the inde-
pendence of the properties of the different knowledge systems relevant to
understanding thought and the brain. As a generalization of the computer
analogy, consider the analogy between a map and a knowledge system (e.g.
histology, phenomenology). If we take a broadly materialist position (and not
a reductionist version of it such as that adopted by Armstrong 1970)
the materialist/dualist debate can be mirrored in the problem of deciding
whether a collection of maps all represent the same part of the earth or dif-
ferent parts. Even if the former, it is most unlikely that they could be placed in
a linear string so that each map was "reduced" to the next; this would apply
only to maps that differed in scale alone. It could well be that one map (e.g. a
detailed contour map) would show considerable similarities between two
regions that are represented very differently on another map (e.g. a vegeta-
tion map). It would obviously be false to claim, after the fashion of P & D, that
the maps represented different parts of the earth.
Using this analogy, not only can a criticism of P & D be developed, but
also a model of how strong arguments for materialism could be formulated. A
more solid inference that such a collection of maps does represent the same
part of the earth could be obtained by finding a strong isomorphism between
certain aspects of one map and another map, and so on, so as to construct a
network of (partial) isomorphisms covering all maps. For any particular map
a crucial issue becomes whether there is any other map, already accepted
as part of the network, with which a (partial) isomorphism can be developed.
The analogous question is whether, already within the domain of the ma-
terialist approach, a (partial) isomorphism can be developed between
phenomenology and any knowledge system.
Strong candidates for the appropriate link system are the related dis-
ciplines of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence [See Pylyshyn:
"Computional models and empirical constraints" BBS 1(1) 1978; Haugeland:
"The nature and plausibility of Cognitivism" BBS 1(2) 1978]. Cognitive
psychology is being increasingly given a materialist base through the
development of the neuropsychology of memory, perception, and cognition.
Over the last ten years there has been an extensive debate within cognitive
psychology on whether bridges can be built between some information-
processing concepts and some phenomenological ones (see Mandler 1975
op. cit. by Mandler; Shallice 1978). Four main positions have been ad-
vocated. Some (e.g. Erdleyi 1974) have claimed that consciousness can be
identified with the contents of a short-term memory store. Others (e.g. Turvey
1974) argue that it arises from active constructivist processes in perception.
Posner and Klein (1973) have argued that it reflects the operation of a high-
level limited-capacity system. Finally, I have claimed that consciousness
results from the existence of system constraints necessary to ensure the
coherence of thought and action, and thus I attempted to explain, in addition,
why consciousness should exist (Shallice 1972op. cit; 1978).
The variety of theoretical positions adopted by cognitive psychologists on
this issue might suggest that no progress is being made. In fact a number of
the differences between the positions may be removed by greater precision
in characterizing the phenomenological concepts being modelled. All these
theories have in common, for instance, that visual experience does not
"arise" in area 17. Given this, it follows that for all of them the paradox of P &
D is immediately dissolved. Moreover, all these positions attempt to incorpo-
rate a variety of nonintuitive empirical phenomena, so they are not merely
token theories. Unless this sort of approach can be shown to be invalid, any
claim for dualism will remain very inadequate.
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Mentalist monism: consciousness as a causal emergent of brain processes.
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